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Balancing the Scales: Reinstating Home Privacy Without 
Violence in Indiana 
TYLER ANDERSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Many are familiar with this epic Home Alone line: “I am gonna give you to the 
count of ten to get your lousy, yellow, no-good keister off my property, before I 
pump your guts full of lead!”1 Strangely enough, this sense of property protection 
has given rise to discussion about home privacy rights in Indiana. The Indiana 
Supreme Court’s first decision in Barnes v. State (Barnes I)2 prompted legal and 
political debates about the castle doctrine—a homeowner’s right to forcibly protect 
her property—and whether citizens should have the right to physically prevent law 
enforcement officers from entering private homes without a warrant and without 
probable cause.3 The Barnes I holding, along with the decision on rehearing 
(Barnes II),4 caused the Indiana General Assembly to amend its castle doctrine 
statute, which now creates a legal defense that seems to rely on the subjective 
perceptions of ordinary citizens and creates a gray area in regard to homeowners’ 
lawful actions during police searches.5 
The facts surrounding Barnes I are that the defendant, Richard Barnes, and his 
wife, Mary, were arguing as Richard was packing his belongings to move out.6 
During the argument, Richard grabbed a phone out of Mary’s hand and threw it 
against a wall.7 Mary then called 911 and “told the dispatcher that [Richard] was 
throwing things in the apartment, but that he had not struck her.”8 The 911 dispatch 
was relayed as a “domestic violence in progress.”9 Two police officers arrived on 
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 1. HOME ALONE (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1990). 
 2. 946 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 2011), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011).  
 3. See, e.g., Paul K. Ogden, Barnes v. State: Dissenters Are Correct that Court Goes 
Too Far in Tossing Out the Right of a Homeowner to Resist Unlawful Entry by a Police 
Officer; Did Court Completely Miss IC 35-41-3-2?, OGDEN ON POLITICS (May 18, 2011, 
10:29 AM), http://www.ogdenonpolitics.com/2011/05/barnes-v-state-dissenters-are-
correct.html; see also Allison Bricker, Ind. Sheriff: If We Need to Conduct Random House to 
House Searches We Will, SMOKING ARGUS DAILY, (May 16, 2011, 1:15 PM), 
http://smargus.com/indiana-sheriff-if-we-need-to-conduct-random-house-to-house-searches-
we-will/. 
 4. 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011). 
 5. See Act of Mar. 20, 2012, Pub. L. No. 161-2012, 2012 Ind. Acts. 3428, 3428–31 
(codified as amended at IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2012)). 
 6. See Barnes I, 946 N.E.2d at 574. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
362 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:361 
 
the scene and confronted Richard in the parking lot outside of the apartment; during 
this encounter, Mary came out with a duffle bag and told Richard to retrieve the 
rest of his belongings.10 Mary retreated back to the apartment, followed by Richard 
and both officers.11 At the apartment’s threshold, Richard affirmatively denied the 
officers entry and blocked the doorway.12 One officer attempted to enter and 
Richard shoved him against a wall, which led to the officers subduing Richard with 
a chokehold and a Taser.13 Richard was charged with battery on a law enforcement 
officer and resisting law enforcement—both class A misdemeanors—as well as 
disorderly conduct—a class B misdemeanor.14 The Indiana Supreme Court 
affirmed all counts and held that the castle doctrine is no longer a legal defense 
against preventing police officers from entering a home.15 
On rehearing, Barnes II proclaimed to reduce the scope of Barnes I only to 
battery against officers entering a private home,16 but the practical effects of the 
two holdings were similar in regard to their effect on home privacy rights.17 At 
issue was whether homeowners have a right to expel law enforcement officers from 
their homes without being criminally prosecuted. Despite the Indiana Supreme 
Court’s efforts to deny that the Barnes facts gave rise to a Fourth Amendment 
issue,18 both holdings essentially deferred to other Fourth Amendment infringement 
remedies to justify discarding, or severely limiting, the castle doctrine when police 
officers threaten home privacy.19 
The decision in both Barnes cases prompted the Indiana General Assembly to 
create the Barnes v. State Subcommittee,20 which subsequently drafted a bill—on 
which the approved statute is based—that lacks legal bite and may prove to be 
dangerous for both private citizens and police officers.21 The new statute reads, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. See id.  
 16. Barnes v. State (Barnes II), 953 N.E.2d 473, 474 (Ind. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the 
Castle Doctrine is not a defense to the crime of battery or other violent acts on a police 
officer.”).  
 17. One possibility of a practical effect of the “battery only” announcement might be 
situations where homeowners threaten officers, but this sort of behavior would just lead to 
the same sort of problems as battering officers; it is hard to imagine that other means of 
preventing officer entry are available. 
 18. See Barnes II, 953 N.E.2d at 474–75 (“We also emphasize that this holding does not 
alter, indeed says nothing, about the statutory and constitutional boundaries of legal entry 
into the home or any other place. Our earlier opinion was not intended to, and did not, 
change that existing law about [the Fourth Amendment].”).  
 19. See Barnes I, 946 N.E.2d at 576. This Note, in Parts II and III, discusses the two 
most litigated Fourth Amendment remedies, evidence exclusion and § 1983 civil actions. 
 20. See Final Report of the Legislative Council Barnes v. State Subcommittee, 2011 
Sess. (Ind. 2011), http://www.in.gov/legislative/interim/committee/lcbs.html. 
 21. Act of Mar. 20, 2012, Pub. L. No. 161-2012, 2012 Ind. Acts 3428, 3428–31 
(codified as amended at IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2012)). 
2013] BALANCING THE SCALES 363 
 
A person is justified in using reasonable force against a public servant 
if the  person reasonably believes the force is necessary to: 
(1) protect the person or a third person from what the person 
reasonably believes to be imminent use of unlawful force; 
(2) prevent or terminate the public servant’s unlawful entry of or 
attack on the person’s dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicle 
. . . .22 
As one would expect, the statute creates exceptions for situations where officers are 
in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect or where a civilian is the initial aggressor.23 
However, Indiana’s enactment of such a statute is illogical. Prosecutors would 
rarely attempt to prosecute offenders in the narrow situations to which the statute is 
intended to apply24 because if the officers initiate the violence wrongfully, then the 
perpetrator would almost surely have a strong case for self-defense.25 Even 
Governor Daniels stated: “In the real world, there will almost never be a situation 
in which these extremely narrow conditions [to justify forcibly expelling police 
officers] are met.”26 This statute may be fairly characterized as a mere political 
gesture that creates more legal problems than additional home privacy rights. 
Setting aside the argument that the statute should not exist, there are two 
additional problems with the statute’s wording. First, it relies on ordinary citizens 
to determine whether a police officer is acting “lawfully,”27 which may lead to 
unnecessary violence and preventable injuries to both police officers and 
homeowners. In regard to home entries and other Fourth Amendment searches, 
courts have struggled to agree on proper standards—it is infeasible for Indiana to 
expect ordinary citizens to decipher Fourth Amendment law, or to even understand 
exactly what this statute allows.28 Second, the statute allows the use of deadly force 
against a police officer only if the force is “reasonably necessary to prevent serious 
bodily injury to the person or a third person.”29 This requirement allows ordinary 
citizens to make another subjective judgment about when to use deadly force, a 
dangerous proposition. Further, the new statute completely disregards the rights of 
citizens to physically prevent an officer from searching the home unlawfully. If 
citizens do not have the right to physically prevent officers from unlawfully 
searching homes under the amended statute, then it does not bolster home privacy 
rights at all; instead, it merely creates confusion and a needless criminal defense 
that is rarely applicable. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(i)(1)–(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 23. § 35-41-3-2(j). 
 24. See Press Release, Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels, Governor Signs SEA 1, Final 
2012 Bill Watch Update (Mar. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release], 
http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=54715&inf
ormation_id=109805&type=&syndicate=syndicate. 
 25. See § 35-41-3-2(a) (“[T]he general assembly does not intend to diminish in any way 
the other robust self-defense rights that citizens of this state have always enjoyed.”). 
 26. Press Release, supra note 24. 
 27. Id. 
 28. This point highlights Governor Daniels’s concern with signing the bill into law: 
“What is troubling to law enforcement officers, and to me, is the chance that citizens hearing 
reports of change will misunderstand what the law says.” Id. 
 29. § 35-41-3-2(k)(2) (emphasis added). 
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The language of Indiana’s unreasonable search or seizure provision is 
practically identical to that of the Fourth Amendment,30 and “remedies” for 
unlawful searches and seizures in both federal and Indiana state law no longer 
protect privacy per se—courts now aim to deter unreasonable police conduct.31 The 
public discussion surrounding the Barnes cases and Indiana’s new statute is 
shedding more light on the balance between homeowners’ rights and police 
conduct—continually, courts are adding more weight to police interests at the 
expense of homeowners’ privacy.32 The statute passed by the Indiana legislature 
seems to be a political compromise rather than a legal tool that attempts to establish 
a balance between individual home privacy rights and the needs of law 
enforcement. Indiana’s new statute, therefore, is ineffective in protecting 
homeowners against unlawful police entry and will inevitably put officers in more 
danger because Indiana citizens will not understand the purpose and meaning of the 
statute.  
Instead of the amended castle doctrine statute, the Indiana legislature should 
have pursued a new and improved civil remedy for home privacy invasions. The 
Indiana Supreme Court partially justified its rationales in Barnes I33 and Barnes II34 
by citing other available remedies for Fourth Amendment and home privacy 
violations.35 Because the amended statute has a limited scope of applicability the 
Indiana legislature should evaluate these other remedies and determine whether 
Indiana adequately protects home privacy. Fourth Amendment and property 
remedies must sufficiently protect homeowners’ rights so that the “narrow 
conditions”36 that give rise to the applicability of the amended statute are 
supplemented by other legal remedies that provide adequate home privacy 
protection in more common circumstances without addressing or encouraging 
violence against police officers.  
To balance the scales and protect home privacy, the law must be analyzed from 
the perspective of a homeowner whose rights are at stake—not from the perspective 
of a police officer performing a duty. Currently, Fourth Amendment remedies such 
as excluding criminal evidence and § 1983 actions37 focus on acts of law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. Compare IND. CONST. art. 1, § 11, with U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 31. See infra Part II. Some might argue that this must be the angle from which the home 
privacy debate is discussed, but one premise of this Note is that placing too much emphasis 
on an officer’s conduct is detrimental to the fundamental purpose of protecting citizens’ 
privacy in the home. 
 32.  See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 33. Barnes v. State (Barnes I), 946 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 
473 (Ind. 2011) (“In sum, we hold that [in] Indiana the right to reasonably resist an unlawful 
police entry into a home is no longer recognized under Indiana law.”). 
 34. Barnes v. State (Barnes II), 953 N.E.2d 473, 474 (Ind. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the 
Castle Doctrine is not a defense to the crime of battery or other violent acts on a police 
officer.”); see also IND. CODE §§ 35-41-3-2(b), 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(B) (2006) (amended 2012). 
In Barnes II, the court, by holding that no Indiana statute allows homeowners to commit 
battery against police officers who unlawfully invade the home, interpreted the traditional 
notions of the castle doctrine out of the Indiana Code. See Barnes II, 953 N.E.2d at 474.  
 35. Barnes I, 946 N.E.2d at 576 (“Nowadays, an aggrieved arrestee has means 
unavailable at common law for redress against unlawful police action.”). 
 36. Press Release, supra note 24. 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) is the means for pursuing civil remedies for violations of 
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enforcement officers, which legally devalues home privacy.38 The new Indiana 
statute cannot provide balance to this conflict because the castle doctrine is woven 
into the Fourth Amendment itself; the Supreme Court has traditionally enshrined 
the home with the highest degree of protection from government intrusions because 
of the Fourth Amendment’s roots in the castle doctrine. Further, the statute’s 
redistribution of subjective discretion from police officers to private citizens is not 
a legitimate or beneficial course of action. Instead, police officers’ discretion 
should be more closely monitored in order to nudge officers toward consulting 
prosecutors and magistrate judges. 
This Note proposes a state statute that would provide Indiana citizens with a 
viable civil remedy specifically for unlawful searches and seizures in the home. 
The proposed statute aims to cover the unaddressed home privacy concerns in the 
amended castle doctrine statute as well as mitigate the lack of home privacy 
protection that results from courts’ focus on police officers’ actions instead of 
homeowners’ privacy. The premise underlying this Note is that courts have 
narrowed the scope of Fourth Amendment remedies to protect police interests and 
have accordingly denied victims of unlawful home entries a means of legal redress 
against law enforcement; thus, statutes like Indiana’s amended castle doctrine 
provide more political collateral and become the desired recourse instead of 
pursuing stronger legal remedies. This Note presents a four-part argument to justify 
a more practical civil remedy for unlawful home entries. Part I will briefly discuss 
the castle doctrine and why its application to the Fourth Amendment cannot create 
an effective remedy. Part II will discuss the doctrinal evolution that has limited the 
effectiveness or existence of the exclusionary rule as a remedy. Part III will address 
the qualified immunity doctrine, which hinders § 1983’s practical viability as a 
civil remedy, particularly in relation to home privacy. Part IV will propose a new 
statute and analyze its legitimacy in comparison with other existing remedies. 
I. THE CASTLE DOCTRINE AND PROTECTING THE HOME 
Although the castle doctrine has played a critical role in shaping the foundations 
of American law and arguably still has a place in contemporary law,39 effectuating 
the doctrine as a Fourth Amendment supplement is implausible. The Fourth 
Amendment has enveloped the castle doctrine by theoretically providing legal 
remedies for homeowners, and the Supreme Court has attempted to preserve the 
indispensability of home protection in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.40 This 
                                                                                                                 
constitutional rights. In regard to the Fourth Amendment, § 1983 actions are sometimes the 
only means of recourse for “innocent” parties, while those who are indicted and tried must 
move to get the evidence found in the unlawful search suppressed under the exclusionary 
rule. 
 38. See infra Parts II.B, III. 
 39. For a more complete discussion of the castle doctrine, see D. Benjamin Barros, 
Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006) and David I. Caplan & Sue 
Wimmershoff-Caplan, Postmodernism and the Model Penal Code v. The Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments—and the Castle Privacy Doctrine in the Twenty-First Century, 73 
UMKC L. REV. 1073 (2005); Jesse Drum, Note, Oh, it is you, is it?”: Closing the Door on 
Reasonable Resistance to Unlawful Police Entry in Indiana, 88 IND. L.J. 393, 407–16 
(2013). 
 40.  See infra Part II.B. 
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Note argues that the Indiana Supreme Court’s Barnes I holding, therefore, correctly 
(although idealistically) relied on the strength of other Fourth Amendment 
remedies to combat home privacy invasions.41  
A. The Short Version of Castle Doctrine History 
United States common law has traditionally recognized the right of homeowners 
to defend themselves against nongovernment intruders. In People v. Tomlins,42 one 
of the most famous American castle doctrine cases, then-Judge Cardozo concluded:  
It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own 
dwelling, is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground 
and resist the attack. He is under no duty to take to the fields and the 
highways, a fugitive from his own home.43  
Cardozo cited to Beard v. United States,44 a Supreme Court case in which the 
Court held that a homeowner may stand his ground and even kill a trespasser when 
a reasonable threat exists.45 Tomlins and Beard highlight the two traditional 
touchstones of the castle doctrine: (1) homeowners have no duty to retreat when an 
intruder threatens the homestead, and (2) homeowners may use reasonable force to 
defend themselves against home intruders. While the right of defending one’s home 
against intruders has basis in the common law, the castle doctrine cannot 
supplement contemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; the doctrine was 
developed to create an affirmative defense for homeowners who committed an 
otherwise criminal act against an intruder who posed a reasonable threat. Physically 
preventing police officers from unlawfully entering a home, however, is not within 
the original castle doctrine’s scope.46  
The castle doctrine was not created for the purpose of prohibiting police from 
entering a private home. In 1604, the castle doctrine was derived from Sir Edward 
Coke’s opinion in Semayne’s Case.47 In Seymayne’s Case, Coke held that one’s 
home is akin to a castle or fortress, and the homeowner could defend against 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41.  Barnes v. State (Barnes I), 946 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 
473 (Ind. 2011).  
 42. 107 N.E. 496 (N.Y. 1914)  
 43. Compare id. at 497 with Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(a) (2012).   
 44. 158 U.S. 550 (1895). 
 45. Id. at 564. In a case where the defendant was facing murder charges for killing a 
man who invaded his property while carrying a deadly weapon with intent to steal a cow, 
Justice Harlan wrote: “The defendant was where he had the right to be, when the deceased 
advanced upon him in a threatening manner . . . [the defendant] was not obliged to retreat . . . 
but was entitled to stand his ground and meet any attack made upon him with a deadly 
weapon . . . .” Id. at 564.  
 46. See Barnes v. State (Barnes I), 946 N.E.2d 572 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 
473 (Ind. 2011). In Barnes I, the Indiana Supreme Court pointed out that modern 
developments such as bail, prompt arraignment hearings, the exclusionary rule, police 
department procedures, and § 1983 civil actions negate the need for the castle doctrine, and 
that “allowing resistance unnecessarily escalates the level of violence . . . .” 946 N.E.2d 572, 
576 (citing State v. Hobson, 577 N.W.2d 825, 835–36 (Wis. 1998)).  
 47. (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.).  
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thieves and felons invading the homestead; however, Coke also stipulated that 
persons enforcing the king’s law have a right of entry.48 Coke imagined the castle 
doctrine to allow, rather than deter, government entry into a private home. As 
Professor D. Benjamin Barros points out, however, the castle doctrine took on a 
new meaning during the American Revolution when colonists aimed to prevent the 
government, British soldiers at that time, from entering one’s home without process 
or justification.49 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment, at least to some extent, with the colonists’ understanding of the castle 
doctrine in mind.50  
B. The Fourth Amendment’s Protection of the Home 
The Supreme Court’s decisions, at least traditionally, have allotted great weight 
to home privacy within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence despite the castle 
doctrine not originally being meant to protect home privacy against police officers 
at common law.51 In fact, the Fourth Amendment was arguably crafted around the 
castle doctrine itself: “The maxim that ‘every man’s house is his castle,’ is made a 
part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen.”52  
A long line of Supreme Court home privacy cases shows the Court’s attempts to 
protect home privacy in order to avoid homeowners’ violence against police 
officers, which may be allowed by the castle doctrine. In Payton v. New York,53 the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Id. at 195. 
 49. See Barros, supra note 39, at 265 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (“[T]he 
castle doctrine radically changed meaning over the course of two centuries, as ‘A man’s 
house is his castle (except against the government)’ yielded to ‘A man’s house is his castle 
(especially against the government).” (emphasis added)). 
 50. This is why the home traditionally has enjoyed the highest level of protection in 
Fourth Amendment law:  
There can be no doubt that [William] Pitt’s address in the House of Commons 
in March 1763 echoed and re-echoed throughout the Colonies: “The poorest 
man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be 
frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; 
the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares 
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!”  
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, n.54 (1980) (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 
U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 51. See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 588–89 (“To be arrested in the home involves not only 
the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is 
simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence of 
exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory authority and when 
probable cause is clearly present.”) (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d 
Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 52. JUSTICE THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION, 367–68 
(4th ed. 1878); see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (“[Colonists’] 
[r]esistance to [writs of assistance] established the principle which was enacted into the 
fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a man’s house was his castle and not to be 
invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers.”).  
 53. 445 U.S. 573. 
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Court set the petitioner free when officers entered his home to arrest him for 
murder without a warrant, but pursuant to a New York statute.54 Payton’s holding 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court has protected the home more than other 
personal spaces that carry some reasonable expectation of privacy.55 Later, in Kyllo 
v. United States,56 the Court held that the use of thermal imaging goggles by police 
to “explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable 
without physical intrusion” was unreasonable without a warrant.57 The Kyllo 
holding prevented police officers from employing uncommonly used technology to 
circumvent the need for a warrant to search homes.58 Finally, in Georgia v. 
Randolph,59 which, like Barnes, involved a domestic dispute,60 the Court held that 
when a cotenant gives permission to enter a home over the objection of another 
cotenant, a warrantless search is unreasonable if the evidence is used against the 
physically present objecting cotenant.61 Although Randolph set forth a somewhat 
confusing holding, the Court settled on a narrow rule that prohibited police officers 
from entering a home when a tenant who is present objects.62 This holding differs 
from automobiles, for example, where a passenger’s objection is irrelevant because 
passengers in an automobile are engaged in a “common enterprise” with the 
driver.63 These cases are illustrative of the Supreme Court’s heightened protection 
of home privacy.64 
In Barnes, the Indiana Supreme Court was correct to eliminate the castle 
doctrine as a defense to assaulting police officers; applying the castle doctrine to 
such situations would require laypeople to speculate as to whether a search is 
lawful.65 Defending one’s home against violent trespassers, as the castle doctrine 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Id. at 576–78.  
 55. Compare Payton, 445 U.S. 573, with New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) 
(explaining that a police officer may automatically search the passenger compartment of an 
automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest). 
 56. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 57. Id. at 40. 
 58. See id. 
 59. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. at 120. In the opinion, the Court emphasized that “nothing in social custom or its 
reflection in private law argues for placing a higher value on delving into private premises to 
search for evidence in the face of disputed consent, than on requiring clear justification 
before the government searches private living quarters over a resident’s objection.” Id. 
 62. For a full analysis on Randolph, see Craig Bradley, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RECENT 
CASES ANALYZED 104 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing Georgia v. Randolph). 
 63. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304–05 (1999); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 
U.S. 408, 413–15 (1997). 
 64. Further illustration of this point can be found by examining Fourth Amendment 
search cases outside of the home. For example, the primary case for automobile searches is 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), which held that searching an entire car for a 
container that the police have probable cause to believe contains illegal substances is 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  
 65. See Barnes v. State (Barnes I), 946 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 953 
N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011) (“In these situations, we find it unwise to allow a homeowner to 
adjudge the legality of police conduct in the heat of the moment.”).  
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was originally meant to allow,66 is a far cry from allowing discretionary assaults on 
police officers, which the new Indiana statute allows in some circumstances.67 The 
Indiana statute’s recognition of the castle doctrine might even raise further 
concerns such as whether homeowners are allowed to use firearms against police 
officers in certain situations.68 In order to avoid the unnecessary violence that the 
castle doctrine creates in cases like Barnes and the narrow circumstances that the 
Indiana statute intends to cover, Indiana must look to other Fourth Amendment 
remedial measures to protect home privacy. The adequacy of the other current 
remedies, however, cannot effectively preserve home privacy against “zealous”69 
police officers’ authority to enter a home. 
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
Although the exclusionary rule was not at issue in Barnes, its status as a Fourth 
Amendment remedy plays a role in the castle doctrine and home privacy debate. 
When the police seize incriminating evidence during an unlawful Fourth 
Amendment search, the defendant can move to suppress the evidence pursuant to 
the exclusionary rule.70 The effect of evidence suppression, therefore, is to set 
guilty parties free when the police violate the Fourth Amendment in order to 
encourage police officers to be more careful. As this Note points out, however, 
police discretion to obtain a warrant or enter a home has recently expanded due to 
courts’ unwillingness to set guilty parties free; the exclusionary rule, then, has little 
value as a prophylactic or remedial measure to combat invasions of home privacy 
by law enforcement. 
A. Brief History of the Exclusionary Rule 
The birth of the suppression remedy is commonly accredited to Weeks v. United 
States,71 where the Supreme Court held that it was prejudicial error for the trial 
court to continue proceedings relying on the petitioner’s papers, which were 
wrongfully seized.72 However, the scope of the exclusionary rule, under Weeks, 
was limited only to “the Federal Government and its agencies.”73 Therefore, as the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. See supra Part I.A. 
 67. See IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(i)(1)–(3) (2012).  
 68. For a full discussion on Second Amendment rights and the ability of citizens to 
resist unlawful police conduct, see Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second 
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 939 (2011).  
 69. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980). In Payton, the Supreme Court 
used this adjective to describe police officers’ ability to make an objective probable cause 
determination in the heat of the moment in comparison to a magistrate. See id.  
 70. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp is the standard citation for the origin 
of the exclusionary rule because the Court’s holding gave the rule its teeth by applying it to 
the states. See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (establishing the 
exclusionary rule for federal cases only). 
 71. 232 U.S. 383. 
 72. Id. at 398. 
 73. Id.  
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Court pointed out in Mapp v. Ohio,74 the Weeks holding created a situation where 
“a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence illegally seized, but a State’s 
attorney across the street may [make use of the evidence], although he supposedly 
is operating under the enforceable prohibitions of the same Amendment.”75 
Accordingly, in Mapp, the Court applied the exclusionary rule to states by way of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.76 Indiana, however, adopted the suppression remedy in 
1923, long before Mapp was decided.77 
The exclusionary rule ideally operates on the theory that law enforcement 
should always obey the laws it enforces: “The criminal goes free, if he must, but it 
is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than 
its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own 
existence.”78 In practice, however, the exclusionary rule is now a deterrence 
measure focused solely on police conduct instead of defendants’ privacy rights: 
“Exclusion is ‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it designed to ‘redress the 
injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search.”79 The Court, in recent years, has 
tended to ignore some previously recognized Fourth Amendment rights in order to 
keep guilty criminals in jail unless suppression would deter egregious police 
conduct in the future.80 The court-created good faith exception81 and permission of 
warrantless entries into homes pursuant to exigent circumstances82 have further 
disfavored home privacy rights while increasing police officers’ subjective 
discretion.83 
B. The Good Faith Exception 
After over twenty years of judicial debate regarding the exclusionary rule’s 
purpose in Fourth Amendment law,84 the Supreme Court implemented the good 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. 367 U.S. 643. 
 75. Id. at 657. 
 76. Id. at 655 (“Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared 
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is 
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal 
Government.”). 
 77. See Callender v. State, 138 N.E. 817 (Ind. 1923) (holding that property seized 
pursuant to an invalid search warrant is inadmissible against the defendant).  
 78. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659. 
 79. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 486 (1976)). 
 80. See infra Part II.B.  
 81. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); infra Part II.B. 
 82. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011); infra Part II.C. 
 83. For a full discussion on the history and basis of the exclusionary rule as a remedy, 
see William C. Heffernan, Foreword, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a 
Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799 (2000). 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Compare Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963) (holding that the exclusionary rule 
“extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of [unlawful searches]”) with Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that applying the exclusionary rule in some situations, 
such as a habeas corpus petition and other “collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims” 
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faith exception in United States v. Leon.85 In Leon, police officers found a large 
quantity of narcotics while conducting searches of three different residences 
pursuant to a facially valid search warrant—the warrant was subsequently deemed 
invalid because the affidavit was insufficient to show probable cause.86 
Acknowledging the continuing debate regarding the correct scope of the 
exclusionary rule,87 the Court held that evidence cannot be excluded when a law 
enforcement officer acts with “objective good faith” unless the warrant has serious 
facial deficiencies.88 Because Leon was limited to situations where officers 
obtained warrants, its holding, to some extent, still checked police discretion. After 
Leon, however, the Court continued to expand the scope of the good faith exception 
in federal law, which was also reflected in Indiana’s state law.89 
1. The Expansion of the Good Faith Exception in Federal Law 
Since Leon, the Supreme Court has substantially expanded the applicable scope 
of the good faith exception. In Illinois v. Krull,90 the Court held that a police 
officer’s good faith reliance on an unconstitutional statute allowing warrantless 
administrative searches of automobiles was reasonable under the good faith 
exception.91 Further, in Herring v. United States,92 the Court held that good faith 
included negligent acts by police departments such as not verifying computer 
records of outstanding warrants.93 In Herring, the Court established that officers 
must be grossly negligent or reckless in order for evidence to be excluded.94 In her 
article analyzing the Court’s holding in Herring, Professor Jennifer E. Laurin 
argues that the Court may have used a method of “borrowing and convergence” to 
establish a good faith standard that would sync with other Fourth Amendment 
remedies.95 Professor Laurin argues that Herring probably did not square with the 
Court’s good faith jurisprudence announced in Leon, but was reasonably related to 
                                                                                                                 
imposes too great of a societal burden by potentially letting guilty defendants free). The 
debate shown here was waged in several Fourth Amendment cases between 1961 and 1984. 
One view was a liberal application of the rule, such as the holding in Wong Sun, also known 
as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, but opponents of the liberal view argued for a 
more limited application of the rule as in Stone v. Powell.  
 85. 468 U.S. 897. 
 86. Id. at 902–03. 
 87. See id. at 907 (“The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the 
vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern.”). 
 88. Id. at 922–23. 
 89. See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 90. 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
 91. Id. at 356–57 (applying a standard for state statutes identical to that for warrants 
announced in Leon). 
 92. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).  
 93. See id. at 146 (“If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a 
warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future 
false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct 
cause a Fourth Amendment violation.”) (emphasis added).  
 94. Id. 
 95. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (2011). 
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the qualified immunity rationale for § 1983 actions announced in Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald.96 
While Professor Laurin presents a thorough analysis of Herring, the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Davis v. United States97 seems to suggest that the Court 
simply does not want exclusion to be a remedy upon which guilty defendants can 
rely.98 In Davis, the Court held that relying on appellate court precedent is 
reasonable and that applying the good faith exception to trump the retroactive law 
doctrine99 was justifiable.100 The Davis decision significantly widened the scope of 
the good faith exception and instilled the Court’s view that “society must swallow 
this bitter pill [of allowing guilty defendants to go free] when necessary, but only as 
a ‘last resort.’”101 Herring and Davis stand for the proposition that acknowledging 
the full scope of guilty defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights would levy too high 
of a social cost to be justified. While Professor Laurin’s general thesis still holds 
weight after Davis, the Court’s language suggests that it is more concerned with 
punishing guilty defendants than privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.102 
This viewpoint on the balance between home privacy and the needs of law 
enforcement diminishes the prophylactic and remedial value of the exclusionary 
rule to almost nothing.  
One must keep in mind that the primary, and perhaps only, emphasis of the good 
faith exception, currently, is the conduct of police officers. In Leon, the Court 
stated: “Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot 
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.”103 A 
critical question for the purposes of protecting against the unlawful entry of a 
private residence,104 however, is whether suppression remedies the violation of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (noting the public policy considerations justifying 
qualified immunity include the increased social costs of litigation for public entities and the 
“diversion of official energy from pressing public issues”); Laurin, supra note 95, at 724–26.  
 97. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 98. See id. at 2428–29 (“The officers who conducted the search did not violate Davis’s 
Fourth Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence. Nor does this 
case involve any ‘recurring or systemic negligence’ on the part of law enforcement. . . . 
Unless the exclusionary rule is to become a strict-liability regime, it can have no application 
in this case.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 99. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (holding that criminal procedure 
issues apply retroactively to all pending cases). 
 100. In Davis, the search was conducted consistent with the methods announced in an 
appellate court case, United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819 (11th Cir. 1996), which was 
later held to be unconstitutional and its abrogation recognized by the Court in Davis. 131 S. 
Ct. at 2428. The petitioner and the dissent argued that applying the good faith exception to 
an overruled precedent revives the overruled “retroactivity regime” established in Linkletter 
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429–30. The majority disagreed and 
held for the government. Id. at 2430–32. 
 101. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).  
 102. See id. 
 103. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984). 
 104. See supra Part II.A. The Court has expressly stated that the exclusionary rule is not 
intended to remedy violations of defendants’ rights. However, the topic of this Note and the 
Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Barnes require that defendants’ rights be observed in 
this analysis; otherwise, the exclusionary rule is nothing but a general spot check on police 
officers to make sure their unlawful searches are not so egregious as to warrant subsequent 
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defendant’s rights—the Supreme Court has rarely addressed this question. One 
further point to note is that, as the Court stated in Davis, the police are not 
exclusively punished when evidence is excluded; the cost of suppressing evidence 
is levied on all of society by letting guilty defendants remain at large.105 Claiming 
to protect police officers or deter certain police conduct avoids a primary issue with 
exclusion and allows the Court to speak for society in regard to how much home 
privacy is enough to balance the bitter result of letting guilty criminals go free.106 
Looking at evidence suppression from the perspective of homeowners rather than 
police officers would more accurately reflect the purposes for, and rationale behind, 
the Fourth Amendment. 
2. The Good Faith Exception in Indiana 
Indiana courts have shown mixed reactions to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the good faith exception.107 Indiana’s good faith statute,108 on its 
face, is fairly consistent with the previously discussed federal law;109 however, 
Indiana’s good faith statute was adopted in 1983,110 one year before the birth of the 
federal good faith exception in Leon.111 While Andrew Krull’s article is correct that 
Indiana courts have not been entirely consistent with the federal good faith 
exception,112 the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, without question, has influenced 
Indiana’s good faith doctrine.113 Also, it is impractical to pursue an elaborate 
                                                                                                                 
judicial action, and the Indiana Supreme Court erred in relying on the exclusionary rule to 
justify eliminating the castle doctrine. 
 105. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426–27. 
 106. On this point, Professor Laurin’s article offers a great analysis. The fact that most 
good faith cases aim to protect police, instead of worrying about the defendant, may be an 
effort to somehow sync exclusion with standards for Fourth Amendment civil remedies. See 
Laurin, supra note 95. However, as a matter of policy, it is still difficult to reconcile Herring 
with defendant’s rights based on such a view because allowing a guilty criminal, and guilty 
criminals in the future, to go free is a different policy concern than holding police 
departments or officers civilly liable for bad conduct. Laurin’s analysis probably works in 
situations where a guilty criminal wins a motion to suppress and files a § 1983 action, but 
Herring really cannot be justified by Laurin’s analysis in civil matters where innocent parties 
are victims of an unlawful search. 
 107. For a full discussion on the good faith exception in Indiana, see Andrew C. Krull, 
Turning Back the Clock: Why the ‘Good Faith’ Exception Was Not and Should Not be 
Recognized in Indiana, RES GESTÆ, Oct. 2007, at 29. Krull calls the good faith exception the 
“‘oops, we didn’t know’ exception or the ‘ignorance of the law works for the police and 
issuing magistrates but not for common citizens’ exception.” Id. at 29. Krull also cites to 
state court decisions in sixteen states that reject the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
good faith exception to some extent. Id. at 29 n.2. 
 108. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-5 (2012). 
 109. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 110. State v. Brown, 840 N.E.2d 411, 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 111. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 112. See Krull, supra note 107. 
 113. This Subsection will show that, like the Supreme Court, the trend in Indiana has 
been to broaden the scope of the good faith exception; however, as Krull suggests in his 
article from 2007, there is some debate in the courts as to the precise scope of the good faith 
exception. See id. at 29. 
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change of Indiana’s “good faith” jurisprudence to establish more home privacy 
protection, as Krull seems to advocate.114 
Some Indiana decisions have established a narrower good faith exception in 
favor of preserving home privacy. In State v. Brown,115 the Indiana Court of 
Appeals concluded that the Indiana good faith statute operates independently of 
federal good faith jurisprudence116 and wrote, “a state may provide greater 
protection from searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment requires.”117 In 
Brown, a police officer gave probable cause testimony and obtained a warrant as a 
result of her testimony; however, a recording of the hearing showed that the officer 
was not under oath when she testified.118 The appellate court affirmed the trial 
court’s grant of defendant Brown’s motion to suppress, holding that the 
exclusionary rule and the good faith exception are “creatures of the judiciary”119 
while the oath or affirmation requirement for warrants is “not a mere technicality 
but is an essential and indispensable part of the warrant requirement . . . .”120 
Writing for the court, Judge Najam dictated that the exclusionary rule “is designed 
not only to deter police misconduct but also to ensure that warrants are properly 
issued.”121 Although Judge Najam’s opinion suggests that Indiana’s good faith 
jurisprudence provides more home privacy protection than the federal standard, the 
Indiana Appellate Court subsequently distinguished the Brown opinion in Wendt v. 
State.122 In Wendt, a police officer, in a probable cause hearing, provided the 
magistrate with false information.123 The appellate court held that the standard for 
misleading the magistrate, or for insufficient basis of probable cause, is that the 
officer must act with reckless disregard for the truth—a very high standard for 
defendants.124  
Although Brown may not be a reflection of Indiana good faith law generally, 
Indiana courts have shown that they may not apply the good faith exception where 
warrants are suspect. In Jaggers v. State,125 the police used information received 
from an anonymous tip to establish probable cause and obtain a warrant.126 On the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See id. at 34–35. 
 115. 840 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 116. Id. at 417. See generally supra Part II.B.1 (discussing federal good faith 
jurisprudence). 
 117. Brown, 840 N.E.2d at 417. 
 118. Id. at 413. 
 119. Id. at 422. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 420. 
 122. 876 N.E.2d 788, 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In Wendt, the state appellate court held 
that when a warrant is based on an informant’s information and the informant gives different 
information at trial than that in the warrant, the good faith exception still applies. Id. at 791. 
 123. See id.at 791. 
 124. Id. Curiously, this standard is the same as the Supreme Court’s standard for actual 
malice in libel cases under the First Amendment. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964). Is this Indiana court suggesting that police officers must either blatantly lie 
or not look into the matter at all in order to violate the Fourth Amendment under these 
circumstances? If so, this standard is nearly impossible to satisfy. Either way, this standard is 
a sharp contrast from Judge Najam’s opinion in Brown. 840 N.E.2d 411. 
 125. 687 N.E.2d 180 (Ind. 1997). 
 126. Id. at 181. 
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appellant’s motion to suppress, the Indiana Supreme Court placed little weight on 
the fact that the officer might have mislead the magistrate to the extent that the 
good faith exception would not apply.127 But, the court nonetheless excluded the 
evidence because the police relied on a warrant that was based on information “so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause that no well-trained officer would reasonably 
have relied on the warrant.”128 Although Jaggers acknowledged an exception to 
good faith set forth by the Supreme Court,129 the reason that the information lacked 
probable cause was because the anonymous tip failed the legal standard developed 
in Illinois v. Gates130 for determining informants’ reliability.131 Thus, the Indiana 
Supreme Court essentially held that Indiana police officers do not act in good faith 
when they misconstrue the Gates test.132 This inference suggests that the Indiana 
Supreme Court intended to apply the good faith exception slightly more narrowly 
than the U.S. Supreme Court has since Leon and thereby allot more state protection 
to home privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment.  
About a decade after Jaggers, however, Indiana courts seemed to broaden the 
scope of the state’s good faith exception. In State v. Spillers,133 police officers used 
information from an arrestee to establish probable cause for a warrant to search 
Spillers’s home.134 The Indiana Supreme Court determined that this information 
was unreliable and did not establish probable cause because the informant had 
already been caught with cocaine, so revealing information about his dealer 
(Spillers) did not expose the informant to additional criminal liability.135 Although 
the unreliable information undermined probable cause, the court nonetheless denied 
exclusion because the officers acted in good faith: “[To have reasonable knowledge 
of what the law prohibits] does not mean that officers are required to engage in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. Id. at 185. See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). 
 128. Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 185.  
 129. Compare Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 185, with Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
 130. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In Gates, the Supreme Court established the standard by which 
anonymous tips become reliable to establish probable cause. Id. at 238. 
 131. See Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 182–83. 
 132. Id. at 183–84. See also Figert v. State, 686 N.E.2d 827 (Ind. 1997). In Figert, the 
Indiana Supreme Court suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant because the 
warrant contained an officer’s opinion that additional drug paraphernalia would be found in 
the defendant’s trailer. Id. at 833. Further, the court opined that naming three different places 
on one warrant was disfavored even though the three places were in a rural area, close in 
proximity, and owned by the same person. Id. at 832–33. In Leon, the warrant named three 
residences in completely separate locations but was upheld under the good faith exception. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 902, 905. The difference in Figert was that the third trailer’s probable 
cause was based on the officer’s opinion, but one might speculate that the Indiana Supreme 
Court generally disfavored that aspect of Leon.  
 133. 847 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 2006). 
 134. Id. at 952. 
 135. Id. at 956–57. A criminal defendant who is caught red-handed is not necessarily a 
reliable informant. Obviously, defendants caught in the act have little bargaining power with 
prosecutors and might be more willing to give up information in exchange for a sentence 
reduction. Therefore, the fact that the informant against Spillers was willing to point the 
finger at Spillers does not necessarily make him a reliable informant because he was already 
facing a criminal sentence, had nothing to lose, and the police did not sufficiently verify the 
accuracy of the informant’s testimony. 
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extensive legal research and analysis before obtaining search warrants.”136 This 
holding flies in the face of the same court’s rationale in Jaggers.137 The Jaggers 
court implied that informant information that fails a legal test warrants exclusion,138 
but, on the other hand, the Spillers court held that even a warrant based on 
unreliable information from a freshly arrested informant can be relied on in good 
faith.139  
After Spillers, the Indiana Supreme Court, similar to the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Davis v. United States,140 held that “[r]etroactive application of [the 
exclusionary rule] would not advance its purpose for the obvious reason that 
deterrence can operate only prospectively.”141 In Membres v. State, the appellant 
moved to suppress evidence seized during a search of his trash bags.142 Membres 
argued that a new standard of criminal procedure, which required “reasonable 
suspicion” for trash searches, was applicable to the case because the new standard 
developed while his trial was pending.143 In denying Membres’s motion to 
suppress, the Indiana Supreme Court used language almost identical to that in 
Davis:  
Exclusion of the fruit of a random search, although important in 
protecting Indiana citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
does not in any way serve to avoid an unjust conviction. To the 
contrary, exclusion of relevant and otherwise admissible evidence can 
prevent conviction where reliable evidence supports it. Because there is 
this cost to enforcing the exclusionary rule, it should be done only 
where appropriate to advance its purpose.144 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. Id. at 958. In its holding, the Indiana Supreme Court quoted Hensley v. State, 778 
N.E.2d 484, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002):  
The exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct, and in many 
cases there is no police illegality to deter. Although the magistrate or judge is 
responsible for determining whether an officer’s allegations establish probable 
cause, an officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination 
must be objectively reasonable. The Leon Court emphasized that the objective 
standard we adopt, moreover, requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge 
of what the law prohibits. In some circumstances an officer will have no 
reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued. 
Depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so 
facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be 
valid.  
Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 957–58 (emphasis added) (citations omitted in original) (quoting 
Hensly, 778 N.E.2d at 489). 
 137. See Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180, 182–83 (Ind. 1997). 
 138. See id. at 184. 
 139. 847 N.E.2d at 958. 
 140. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 141. Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ind. 2008).  
 142. Id. at 268. 
 143. Id. at 269–71 (discussing retroactive application of Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 
356 (Ind. 2005), which was decided two weeks after search of Membres’s trash). 
 144. Id. at 274; United States v. Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428–29 (2011). 
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The Membres court relied on Indiana law,145 but the application of Indiana good 
faith law, outside of Judge Najam’s opinion in Brown,146 has been similar to the 
Supreme Court’s good faith exception in downplaying home privacy in favor of 
incarcerating guilty criminals.  
3. The Good Faith Exception and Home Privacy 
Regardless of one’s opinion of the good faith doctrine, it cannot be seen as an 
adequate prophylactic or remedial measure that negates the need for the castle 
doctrine. The problem is, as shown above, the courts rely on “reasonableness” as 
the touchstone of privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. Despite their efforts, 
courts cannot objectively determine whether a police officer’s actions were 
reasonable “by [retroactively] examining the factual circumstances that the officers 
confronted.”147 By trying to decipher objective reasonableness, courts have done 
little more than deem unconstitutional searches legitimate for the sake of protecting 
police officers and preventing guilty criminals from going free, which flies in the 
face of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.148 
Although Indiana is free to grant more Fourth Amendment rights to citizens than 
has the Supreme Court,149 this Note does not argue that Indiana should reduce the 
scope of its good faith exception in criminal law. The good faith exception 
certainly focuses on police officers rather than homeowners, but this Note does not 
seek to analyze whether such a change to the criminal law would be beneficial. 
Police officers should have some room for error, even at the expense of some 
Fourth Amendment rights, but the extent to which home privacy rights have been 
disregarded has made the law such that courts cannot reasonably rely on exclusion 
as an adequate remedy to breaches of home privacy.150 
C. Exigent Circumstances 
The exigent circumstances exception, in some cases, is more harmful to home 
privacy than the good faith exception. Unlike the good faith exception, which 
disallows suppressing evidence seized because of police officers’ reliance on some 
authority, exigencies are situations where officers have discretion to execute a 
warrantless entry of a home without any legal home privacy violation at all. The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. Id. at 274 (citing Callender v. State, 138 N.E. 817 (Ind. 1923), to show that Indiana 
adopted the exclusionary rule long before Mapp applied the exclusionary rule to the states).  
 146. See supra text accompanying notes 115–21. 
 147. L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 
1143, 1143 (2012). 
 148. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance 
Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1562–63 
(2009) (arguing that the exclusionary rule and other prophylactic approaches to correcting 
the exclusionary rule in community caretaking situations presents a risk of watering down 
the potency of the Fourth Amendment’s protections); supra Part II.A; supra notes 70–75 and 
accompanying text.  
 149. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 150. For a full discussion on potential alternatives to problems with the exclusionary rule, 
see, for example, Dimino, supra note 148. 
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Supreme Court’s exigent circumstances doctrine allows the police to enter a home 
with probable cause, but without a warrant, when officers are in “hot pursuit” of a 
fleeing suspect;151 the officers have reason to believe the suspects are destroying 
evidence;152 or when the officers need to enter a home to prevent harm or injury to 
someone inside of the home.153 Because the exigent circumstances doctrine is based 
on a “reasonableness” standard—like the good faith exception154—and allows 
officers to enter a private home based on personal judgment, this exception, 
particularly in hot pursuit and destruction of evidence situations,155 further limits 
the viability of the exclusionary rule as an adequate protector of home privacy.  
1. Hot Pursuit 
The hot pursuit exigency allows officers to enter a home without a warrant while 
pursuing a suspect. In Warden v. Hayden,156 the Court held that the warrantless 
entry into the defendant’s home was reasonable when he was seen committing a 
robbery and entering the home minutes prior to the officers’ arrival: “The Fourth 
Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an 
investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of 
others.”157 The Court relied on Warden in deciding United States v. Santana,158 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (retreating into home during 
course of arrest does not justify suppression when officers pursued suspect into home); 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (pursuit of identified robber who had entered a 
private home minutes before the officers was reasonable). Cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 
740 (1984) (pursuit of the defendant, who was suspected of driving drunk, into his home was 
unreasonable due to the time that had elapsed and the nature of the crime). 
 152. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (police-created exigencies are still 
applicable to the exigent circumstances exception so long as “the police [do not] create the 
exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth 
Amendment); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003) (forcible entry into home after 
knock, while serving a search warrant, was justified due to possibility of suspects destroying 
drug evidence).  
 153. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (when officers see a fight occurring 
inside of a home, it is reasonable for the officers to enter the home without a warrant); 
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (entering an apartment from which a gunshot was 
fired was reasonable); Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930 (Ind. 2006) (police officers sniffing 
around a home was reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception due to the odor of 
an explosive and flammable chemical being emitted from the home); Cudworth v. State, 818 
N.E.2d 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (warrantless search of home was unreasonable because 
there was no showing that appellant was in need of immediate aid). 
 154. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404–05 (warrantless home entry by police officers is 
allowed when the circumstances show an objectively reasonable basis for entry, regardless 
of the officers’ subjective intent). 
 155. Although the Barnes facts probably represent a community-caretaking situation, 946 
N.E.2d 572 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011), the purpose of this Note is to 
discuss the problems with home privacy rights, generally, on which the Barnes decisions 
shed light. For a full discussion of problems with community-caretaking searches, see 
Dimino, supra note 148. 
 156. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
 157. Id. at 298–99. 
 158. 427 U.S. 38 (1976). 
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where it defined hot pursuit as “some sort of chase, but it need not be an extended 
hue and cry in and about the public streets.”159  
The hot pursuit exigency has created a difficulty with the home privacy balance 
because it is difficult for judges and police officers to determine what constitutes a 
hot pursuit. Although homeowners probably never want officers entering a home 
without a warrant, the hot pursuit exigency sets forth reasonable limitations to 
home privacy because officers’ subjective judgments are limited during a hot 
pursuit. The Supreme Court determined one boundary of hot pursuit in an atypical 
case that has proven to be somewhat of an enigma in Fourth Amendment case law. 
In Welsh v. Wisconsin,160 the Court held that entering the home of a defendant 
suspected of driving while intoxicated was not a legitimate exigency and, thus, 
entering the home without a warrant was unreasonable.161 The Court ruled that the 
facts of Welsh did not show that the police officer was engaged in a hot pursuit at 
all162: the officer was called to the scene by a third party, found the defendant’s 
abandoned car, and checked the car’s registration to obtain the defendant’s 
address.163 The nature of the hot pursuit exigency is such that police officers do not 
have time to make calculated decisions in pursuit of a fleeing or dangerous suspect; 
therefore, courts tend to maintain a reasonable balance between law enforcement 
needs and home privacy by applying the hot pursuit exception only to cases where 
halting an investigation to obtain a warrant is impractical or dangerous.164  
The problem with hot pursuit exigencies, however, is that judges cannot put 
themselves in the positions of the police officers and vice versa. Police officers do 
not know the intricacies of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding home 
privacy, and judges cannot understand the difficulties of fighting crime in most 
cases. Therefore, there may be a natural tendency to skew the balance between 
homeowners’ rights and needs of law enforcement—after all, police officers are not 
entering judges’ homes in hot pursuit. The new Indiana statute also accounts for hot 
pursuit exigencies,165 and seems to make an attempt to create a sort of balance in 
home privacy rights. But, this specific provision in the new statute does not protect 
home privacy and also does not proactively protect officers from the dangerous 
nature of hot pursuits; the statute retroactively eliminates the defense for suspects 
who harm police officers during a hot pursuit—for the statute to be applicable, the 
damage has already been done. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. Id. at 43 (alteration in original omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
Santana, police officers set up a drug bust, and upon moving in to arrest the defendant, she 
retreated into the house. Id. at 39–40. 
 160. 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
 161. Id. at 754 (“To allow a warrantless home entry on these facts would be to approve 
unreasonable police behavior that the principles of the Fourth Amendment will not 
sanction.”). See also Sapen v. State, 869 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (police officer 
entering the defendant’s garage and home office based on the suspicion that the defendant 
was driving while intoxicated was unreasonable). 
 162. Id. at 753 (“[T]he claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no 
immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 163. Id. at 742. 
 164. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
 165. See IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(j)(1) (2012). 
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2. Destruction of Evidence 
The “imminent destruction of evidence” exigency166 is the exception to the 
warrant requirement that has become most detrimental to home privacy. The 
destruction of evidence exigency allows police officers to enter a home without a 
warrant, or to restrict suspects from entering their home,167 when the police have 
probable cause to believe destructible evidence is inside.168 Many cases that apply 
the destruction of evidence exigency involve narcotics;169 if the police have a 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect will destroy the drugs, the police may enter 
the home immediately in order to preserve the evidence.170 The Court’s holding in 
Kentucky v. King,171 which determined that police-created exigencies are within the 
scope of the exception,172 is illustrative of this exigency’s detriment to home 
privacy. In King, police officers were pursuing a fleeing suspect, but did not see 
which apartment the suspect entered.173 Because the smell of marijuana emanated 
from King’s apartment, the police officers knocked and entered the apartment as 
soon as they heard “people inside moving.”174 Although the Court remanded the 
question of whether any movement could constitute reasonable suspicion that 
evidence would be destroyed,175 the Court nonetheless held that police conduct may 
create an exigency without violating the Fourth Amendment.176 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. E.g., Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 938 (Ind. 2006) (“Possible imminent 
destruction of evidence is one exigent circumstance that may justify a warrantless entry into 
a home if the fear on the part of the police that the evidence was immediately about to be 
destroyed is objectively reasonable.”).  
 167. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). 
 168. See id. See also, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011); United States v. 
Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003). 
 169. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, and Banks, 540 U.S. 31, McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, for 
example, all involved drug crimes. 
 170. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 36–37. Banks is somewhat of a special case because it 
applies the destruction-of-evidence exigency to the execution of warrants. The police in 
Banks had a warrant, but entered the house approximately 15–20 seconds after knocking 
because of fear that the suspect would destroy the cocaine. Id. at 38. The Court unanimously 
held that when police officers have a reasonable suspicion that a suspect might destroy 
evidence, they may enter the home and are immune from liability for damages incurred in 
the entry, such as breaking down a door. Id. at 37. This doctrine is applicable to warrantless 
entries as well. See supra text accompanying notes 156–65. 
 171. 131 S. Ct. at 1858 (“[W]arrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances 
make it reasonable . . . to dispense with the warrant requirement. . . . [T]he exigent 
circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding 
the exigency is reasonable in the same sense.”). 
 172. The police in King created the exigency by knocking on the wrong door after they 
had lost their suspect. However, the Court held that as long as police officers do not engage 
in, or threaten to engage in, conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, police-created 
exigencies are the same as any other exigency. Id. 
 173. Id. at 1854. 
 174. Id. at 1854–55 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 175. See id. at 1863–64 (“Like the court below, we assume for the purposes of argument 
that an exigency existed.”). 
 176. See id. at 1862 (“Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional rights 
[by answering the door and denying entry] but instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence 
2013] BALANCING THE SCALES 381 
 
The destruction of evidence exigency has created a difficult friction in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence between the needs of law enforcement and home 
privacy rights.177 The Court, again, seems to be favoring the needs of law 
enforcement to the detriment of home privacy.178 Some have argued that courts 
should set out a bright-line standard for application of,179 and manageable 
definitions of,180 destruction-of-evidence exigencies so that exigencies are not 
assessed on a case-by-case basis.181 These arguments are legitimate, but it is 
difficult to believe the Supreme Court or individual states will clearly define 
destruction of evidence exigencies and thereby restrict reasonable police 
conduct.182 Because there are no clearly defined standards of what constitutes an 
exigency in destruction-of-evidence situations, the newly-amended Indiana statute 
implausibly assumes citizens will be able to reasonably decipher when a law 
enforcement officer is acting lawfully and when reasonable resistance is 
appropriate.183  
The exigent circumstances exception, along with the good faith exception, have 
shown that, despite the “objective reasonableness”184 standard for excluding 
                                                                                                                 
have only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent-circumstances search that may 
ensue.”). 
 177. Compare King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862, with Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 
(1948) (“The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not 
only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and 
freedom from surveillance.”). See also Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy 
in Warrantless Searches to Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 17 PACE 
L. REV. 37, 44 (1997) (arguing for bright line definition of the destruction of evidence 
exigency, which allows warrantless home entries only in specific and limited circumstances 
where officers’ conduct does not create the exigency and a warrant cannot be practically 
obtained). 
 178. See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1864 (“In lieu of presenting their evidence to a neutral 
magistrate, police officers may now knock, listen, then break the door down, nevermind that 
they had ample time to obtain a warrant.”) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).  
 179. See Salken, supra note 177, at 42. Although the Supreme Court implicitly rejected 
Salken’s proposed statute in Kentucky v. King, holding that police-created exigencies are 
reasonable, this general line of argument has merit because bright-line standards have shown 
to be beneficial to both the police and private citizens in other areas of criminal law. See 
King 131 S. Ct. at 1863–64. 
 180. See John Mark Huff, Warrantless Entries and Searches Under Exigent 
Circumstances: Why Are They Justified and What Types of Circumstances Are Considered 
Exigent?, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 373 (2010) (synthesizing the array of factors that courts 
use to determine exigent circumstances in order to present a practical guideline for analyzing 
such cases). See also King, 131 S. Ct. at 1861 (never reaching the question as to whether any 
movement inside constitutes an exigency). 
 181. One example of bright-line standards working is the Fifth Amendment Miranda 
doctrine, which essentially gives arrestees two options (silence or an attorney) during 
interrogation, but also defines exactly what officers must do in order to conduct a legitimate 
interrogation. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (although supplementary 
to the main issue of the case, many police forces submitted amicus briefs in favor of 
Miranda’s bright-line formulation of Fifth Amendment rights). 
 182. See L. Timothy Perrin, H. Mitchell Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, It is Broken: 
Breaking the Inertia of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 971 (1999). 
 183. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
 184. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); see also Whren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 806 (1996) (constitutional reasonableness does not depend on the motivations of 
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evidence, the subjective judgment of police officers is critical in assessing Fourth 
Amendment rights. Whether a police officer obtains a warrant is a completely 
subjective determination; the “objective reasonableness” test retroactively 
determines whether the officers who choose not to obtain a warrant do so 
reasonably. Courts defer to police officers’ judgment simply because of their 
occupational status, not because of skill, experience, training, or expertise—police 
officers are not privy to the large body of Fourth Amendment case law.185 Relying 
on officers’ subjective judgment in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to a 
“hopeless clutter” of case law in regard to determining a fair and balanced 
standard.186 Due to this standard, the exclusionary rule does not serve as a 
prophylactic or remedial measure.187 In cases such as Barnes, therefore, it is 
inadequate to rely on the exclusionary rule as a guardian of home privacy. Further, 
the newly-amended Indiana statute perpetuates the subjective intent problem by 
requiring citizens to determine whether an officer is acting lawfully instead of 
filtering officers’ “mixed-motive”188 determinations of probable cause to 
magistrates and prosecutors. 
III. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS—THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY PROBLEM 
Section 1983 is more applicable to the Barnes decisions because, in the facts, 
the police did not find contraband to use against the defendant in a criminal 
proceeding. When police officers conduct an unlawful search and no criminal 
charges result, or the suppression remedy has been exhausted, the victim of the 
unlawful search can file a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.189 The surface 
requirements for stating a cause of action under § 1983 seem simple enough; the 
plaintiff must assert that some person, acting under the “color of state or territorial 
                                                                                                                 
the officers involved). 
 185. See Richardson, supra note 147, at 1155.  
 186. See id. at 1157 (citing Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 407, 415 (2006)).  
 187. See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1375 (2008) (showing in a federal court sample, evidence was 
excluded in only 1.3% of cases and prosecutors refused to prosecute due to fear of exclusion 
in only 0.2% of cases in which felony arrests were made.).  
 188. See Dimino, supra note 148, at 1492–93. 
 189. Section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), is a federal statute that allows citizens to 
bring civil suits against local and state government entities for unconstitutional acts. The 
method of suing a federal entity on a direct civil claim dealing with constitutional rights is a 
Bivens action. This action gets its name from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For the purposes of this Note, I will not 
discuss Bivens in great detail because it applies to federal entities, but I will cite to some of 
the ideals that the doctrine aims to fulfill in regard to civil remedies generally. The general 
holding in Bivens was that state tort claims are not sufficient remedies for constitutional 
wrongs in some cases, and public officials may be individually liable for constitutional 
wrongs under federal law. See id. at 397. However, this cause of action has never really been 
effective. For a full discussion, see Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The 
Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 66 
(1999) (showing data that Bivens actions almost never result in damages for the plaintiff—
one notable statistic given was out of approximately 12,000 Bivens actions between 1971 
and 1985, only four plaintiffs received damages that were not reversed on appeal). 
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law,” deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.190 The viability of this remedy 
has decreased, however, in correspondence with the expanded application of the 
qualified immunity defense, which immunizes police officers and municipal police 
departments from civil liability unless a clearly established constitutional right has 
been violated.191 Moreover, § 1983 suits relating to Fourth Amendment issues, 
namely home privacy, seem to be particularly difficult for plaintiffs because the 
standard, at least partially, relies on criminal case law regarding the exclusionary 
rule, and, as seen in Part II, the criminal standards weigh heavily against home 
privacy rights.192 This application makes little sense if one considers the rationale 
of Fourth Amendment expansion in exclusionary rule jurisprudence—keeping 
guilty criminals off of the streets—in relation to the nature of § 1983 actions where 
the homeowner may not be indicted or suspected for any crime. 
The qualified immunity defense in § 1983 actions was once regarded as a 
standard intended to mirror common law government immunity for the sake of 
public policy.193 In Gomez v. Toledo,194 the Court recognized that qualified 
immunity was a typical defense that is not “relevant to the existence of the 
plaintiff’s cause of action” and that the burden of showing qualified immunity rests 
with the defendant.195 Further, Gomez endorsed a standard for qualified immunity 
that required “objectively reasonable belief” that the conduct performed was 
lawful, and a sincere, good faith belief on the government actor’s part that at the 
time of the act he or she was acting lawfully.196 This standard had two problems. 
First, § 1983 qualified immunity is intended to be immunity from suit, and it is 
impossible to determine whether a municipal police officer or department should be 
immune from suit when the standard relies on “reasonableness.” Second, as one 
might suspect, making a showing that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law197 on an issue of subjective intent, which is governed by factual 
interpretation, proved to be very difficult, and a surplus of litigation ensued. Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 190. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). 
 191. For a full discussion on the restrictions that hinder successful § 1983 claims, see 
Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Congress Needs to Repair the Court’s Damage to § 1983, 16 TEX. J. 
C.L. & C.R. 29 (2010). 
 192. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) (holding that officers entering a 
home without a warrant are entitled to qualified immunity where there is any conflicting 
state or federal law because the law in such cases is not “clearly established”). 
 193. See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 639 (“[Qualified immunity] has been based on an 
unwillingness to infer from legislative silence a congressional intention to abrogate 
immunities that were both ‘well established at common law’ and ‘compatible with the 
purposes of the Civil Rights Act.’”) (citation omitted). 
 194. 446 U.S. 635 (1980). 
 195. Id. at 640. 
 196. Id. at 639–41 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975)). Wood v. 
Strickland is most often the case accredited with establishing this subjective reasoning. 
 197. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (requiring, for summary judgment, that no issue of material 
fact be disputed, and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law). Many § 1983 
lawsuits proceeded to discovery because of the federal summary judgment requirement. See 
Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 
139, 148 (“It soon became apparent to the Court that the subjective element of the immunity 
allowed too many insubstantial claims to go to trial, because allegations of malicious intent 
were difficult to rebut on a motion to dismiss or summary judgment.”).  
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the subjective intent standard followed in Gomez was abandoned two years later in 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.198  
By eliminating the subjective element in qualified immunity analyses, the 
Harlow holding promoted judicial efficiency by preventing litigation in many 
meritless § 1983 claims; however, the new standard also established a means by 
which government actors could disproportionately avoid liability through qualified 
immunity.199 In Harlow, the Court stated: 
[W]e conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice 
to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the 
burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that 
government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.200 
A “clearly established” right must be “sufficiently clear [so] that a reasonable 
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”201 This standard 
has proven just as difficult for plaintiffs to overcome as defendants overcoming 
subjective malice allegations, and therefore merely reversed the balance of rights 
instead of shifting it. Further, when plaintiffs cannot meet the “clearly established” 
standard, they are theoretically barred from suit and are left with no remedy for the 
alleged violation—when qualified immunity is not granted, defendants at least have 
the opportunity to win on the merits or by summary judgment.202  
The elimination of the subjective element of qualified immunity analyses has 
created a distinct imbalance between citizens and government actors. As noted in 
Part II, Indiana courts have held that the standard for police misleading a magistrate 
in obtaining a warrant is reckless disregard for the truth,203 and the Supreme Court 
has determined that the police must act with gross negligence or recklessness to 
constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.204 Further, courts have not hesitated to 
defer to police officers’ subjective judgments in not obtaining a warrant.205 It seems 
unfair, or at least inconsistent, then, that excluding improperly seized evidence 
                                                                                                                 
 
 198. 457 U.S. 800, 816–18 (1982) (noting that “an official’s subjective good faith has 
been considered to be a question of fact that some courts have regarded as inherently 
requiring resolution by a jury”). 
 199. The holding in Harlow was eventually manifest in the holdings of Saucier v. Katz, 
533 U.S. 194 (2001), and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), which made it 
extremely difficult, especially under Fourth Amendment claims, for plaintiffs to get over the 
qualified immunity standard. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in 
Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115; Bodensteiner, supra note 191. 
 200. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18 (emphasis added). 
 201. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (holding, in part, that qualified 
immunity can apply to government officials who conduct unlawful warrantless searches). 
 202. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 203. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.  
 204. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 205. See supra Part II. 
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requires a showing of bad faith when bad faith is not even considered in preventing 
plaintiffs from suing government officials under § 1983.206  
Another aspect of the imbalance created in Harlow is that § 1983 actions for 
home search violations may be difficult to show because many rights are not 
“clearly established.” For Fourth Amendment claims, the “clearly established” 
standard places a particularly heavy burden on plaintiffs; the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement are analyzed on a case-by-case basis, and “clearly established” 
standards are uncommon.207 For example, in Pearson v. Callahan,208 the Supreme 
Court held that officers were entitled to qualified immunity under the rarely 
recognized “consent-once-removed” doctrine when the officers conducted a 
warrantless home entry and arrest based on the consent of an informant, not the 
homeowner.209 For the Court, qualified immunity protects “all [police officers] but 
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”210 This view of 
§ 1983 creates a gaping hole in which home privacy rights can be lost or 
disregarded. Eliminating meritless cases is a legitimate interest, but the evolution of 
§ 1983 since Harlow has tipped the balance too far in favor of defendants and has 
made it too difficult for plaintiffs with traditionally legitimate claims to recover 
damages when home privacy rights have been violated.  
In addition to the “clearly established” right standard, the Court has developed 
various standards of “sequencing” for § 1983 determinations.211 The sequencing of 
qualified immunity determinations is particularly important because qualified 
immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . . [I]t is 
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”212 Therefore, the 
constitutional issues must be addressed early in the litigation process. In Siegert v. 
Gilley,213 the Court held that once a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the judge 
must determine the state of the current constitutional law and whether the law was 
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation before proceeding to 
discovery.214 Later, in Saucier v. Katz,215 the Court established a two-step process 
by which the Siegert analysis must be conducted; first, the judge must determine 
                                                                                                                 
 
 206. See supra note 124. Because a bad faith or actual malice standard is so high, it is 
unfair to apply it in this way. One can contrast this application with that in First Amendment 
torts where the actual malice standard serves free speech by preventing public figures from 
receiving damages for public opinion. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). Here, on the other hand, the subjective standard is not protecting constitutional 
rights, but protecting those who have allegedly violated the constitutional right. 
 207. See supra Part II. 
 208. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 209. Id. at 228, 244–45. 
 210. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
 211. For statistical breakdowns of the different sequencing standards, see Paul W. 
Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation of 
Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401 (2009); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified 
Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667 (2009); Greg Sobolski & 
Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions 
and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523 (2010).  
 212. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis omitted). 
 213. 500 U.S. 226 (1991). 
 214. Id. at 231–34. 
 215. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
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whether a constitutional right was violated; then the judge must determine whether 
that right was clearly established.216 The Court justified the Saucier standard by 
determining, logically, that if no violation of a constitutional right occurred, the 
right could not be clearly established.217 However, in Pearson v. Callahan,218 the 
Court retreated from Saucier’s mandatory two-step process and granted lower 
courts discretion as to the sequence of analyzing the two necessary questions set 
forth in Saucier, which put more emphasis on the “clearly established” analysis 
without requiring a consideration of whether a right was violated.219 Because the 
“clearly established” standard is such a high bar for plaintiffs, the sequencing 
decisions are important for two reasons: (1) the sequence of the analyses, according 
to some empirical studies, produce different outcomes for plaintiffs,220 and (2) 
initially addressing the constitutional questions, as Saucier mandates, might allow 
courts to develop clearly established constitutional rights for future § 1983 
actions.221  
In establishing a sequence for qualified immunity analysis,222 the Court aimed to 
organize § 1983 suits and rectify the administrative difficulties that result from 
litigating meritless cases.223 Although efficiency is a general goal of recognizing 
the qualified immunity defense, tackling constitutional questions when the 
government actor is inevitably entitled to qualified immunity clogs dockets and 
increases expenses for all parties. The Court endorsed this point in County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis,224 when it barred the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process action because the government actors clearly did not satisfy the requisite 
“malicious motive” during a high-speed chase.225 Further, as Professor Nancy 
Leong points out in her empirical analysis of pre-Pearson sequencing standards, 
pressuring courts with restricted resources to decide constitutional issues that will 
inevitably result in qualified immunity may lead to poor holdings on important 
issues.226 Leong’s empirical analysis concludes that courts generated more 
constitutional law due to the Saucier sequencing standard,227 but it “uniformly 
denies the existence of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights” in comparison with § 1983 
cases prior to Siegert and Saucier.228 Other empirical analyses have drawn different 
conclusions, however, possibly because Leong compared post-Saucier data with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216. Id. at 201. 
 217. See id.  
 218.  555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 219. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–37 (noting that the Saucier standard can be a waste of 
judicial resources in certain cases; for instance, when a constitutional right is violated, but it 
is clear that the right was not clearly established). 
 220. See Leong, supra note 211; Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 211. 
 221. See Jeffries, supra note 199. 
 222. See supra text accompanying notes 211–16. 
 223. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 854–55. 
 226. Leong, supra note 211, at 680–81 (citing County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 858–59 
(Breyer, J. concurring)). 
 227. Id. at 692–93. 
 228. Id. at 693. 
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that of cases before the initial Siegert standard was imposed.229 While Leong’s 
analysis may not be the most accurate empirical analysis of the sequencing 
standards, Leong’s analysis is important for the purposes of this Note because it 
shows that the sequencing standards may have created a tradition of denying 
constitutional rights that were recognized prior to Siegert.230 
After determining that sequencing forces courts to address constitutional issues, 
the next question, for the sake of analyzing the viability of § 1983 as a remedy, is 
whether addressing the constitutional issue in each case should be mandatory.231 
Professor John C. Jeffries, Jr. argues that Saucier may be the better sequencing test 
because forcing courts to rule on whether a constitutional right exists in each case 
creates a basis for “clearly established” law.232 Professor Jeffries argues, however, 
that the Saucier test may allow constitutional rights to be compromised when 
“claims are resolved solely on the grounds of qualified immunity.”233 In other 
words, the benefit of establishing clear rules for § 1983 actions loses its efficacy 
when the rules are crafted under the assumption that qualified immunity is the 
overwhelmingly preferred outcome.234 The Pearson test235 might exacerbate this 
problem with the Saucier test;236 if judges make decisions based on a preference for 
qualified immunity, then not mandating the constitutional issue to be addressed 
limits the available “clearly established” law on which § 1983 plaintiffs may rely 
while the result in the instant case remains the same.237 On the other hand, if 
Leong’s empirical analysis is illustrative of all § 1983 actions, then forcing judges 
to address constitutional issues further decreases the chances of plaintiffs’ success 
because the constitutional issues will likely be decided in favor of awarding 
government actors qualified immunity, which further eliminates legally enforceable 
home privacy rights. The sequencing standards, then, have essentially proved to be 
a double-edged sword to § 1983 plaintiffs. 
Many of the same difficulties with vindicating Fourth Amendment violations are 
present in § 1983 actions, as in excluding unlawfully seized evidence in criminal 
cases. First, Fourth Amendment violations will rarely be “clearly established”; 
therefore, searches that are “reasonably unreasonable” might still justify qualified 
immunity in a § 1983 action.238 Based on this premise, both sides of the argument 
                                                                                                                 
 
 229. Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 211, at 551–52. 
 230.  “Recognized prior” refers to Leong’s comparison of constitutional rights after 
Saucier with those before Siegert. 
 231. This was the holding in Saucier, but the mandatory portion of Saucier was overruled 
by Pearson. See supra text accompanying notes 215–18. 
 232. See Jeffries, supra note 199. 
 233. Id. at 120. 
 234. See id. at 120–21. Leong’s empirical analysis shows this to be the case in regard to 
rights under Saucier in comparison with rights before Siegert. See supra text accompanying 
notes 227–28. Also, qualified immunity is almost certain except in cases where government 
actors portray a “malicious motive” or act with recklessness. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223 (2009).  
 235. See supra text accompanying note 219. 
 236. See supra text accompanying note 216. 
 237. Professor Jeffries also makes this argument, but aims the argument at discussing § 
1983 actions independently. See Jeffries, supra note 199. 
 238. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203 (2001). 
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concerning constitutional issues in the qualified immunity sequence hurt plaintiffs 
in many § 1983 claims because courts already allow a significant amount of police 
discretion in criminal cases.239 By building additional immunities into civil liability 
in § 1983 actions, courts create an exceedingly difficult bar for plaintiffs to clear. 
Creating such a high bar for plaintiffs undermines the purpose of providing civil 
damages for constitutional wrongs, which is to remedy harms in order to check the 
government actors’ power.240 In general, it is neither good policy nor consistent 
with the purposes of the Fourth Amendment to besiege police officers and 
departments with lawsuits; however, there must be more balance when the police 
have significant discretion241 over citizens’ civil liberties such as home privacy. 
IV. PROPOSED STATUTE AND ANALYSIS 
If the Fourth Amendment is based, at least partially, on the American 
conception of the castle doctrine, then one main concern of the Fourth Amendment 
should be to prevent government actors from unlawfully invading the privacy of 
the home.242 This Note has argued that using the castle doctrine as a defense to 
forcibly preventing police officers from entering a home is an irrational solution;243 
however, public policy, according to the courts, also favors not remedying Fourth 
Amendment violations when criminals are prosecuted with unlawfully seized 
evidence244 or when government actors may be subjected to civil liability.245 
Therefore, the Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Barnes highlights a difficult 
problem that leaves victims of home privacy breaches without much legal recourse. 
The newly-amended Indiana statute does not remedy the problem brought to light 
in Barnes because it shifts an excessive amount of discretion to civilians and could 
possibly create more dangerous situations for police officers. Because current 
remedies for unlawful home entry by police are inefficacious, the Indiana 
legislature should pass a statute with language similar to the following: 
(a) A plaintiff has a prima facie cause of action in a civil case against a 
law enforcement officer individually, and/or the acting law 
enforcement department, when a court has first determined, on facts 
viewed most favorably for the plaintiff, that an unlawful search or 
seizure has been conducted in a place of residence by that officer or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 239. See supra Part III. 
 240. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (“An agent acting—albeit unconstitutionally—in the name of the 
United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser 
exercising no authority other than his own. . . . And where federally protected rights have 
been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their 
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation omitted)). 
 241. See supra Part II. Exclusionary rule jurisprudence has placed a great deal of 
discretion into the hands of police officers. 
 242. See supra Part I. 
 243. See supra Part I. 
 244. See supra Part II. 
 245. See supra Part III. 
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policies of that department, in violation of Indiana Constitution 
article 1, section 11.  
(b) Determinations under section (a) will not be affected by the good 
faith exception, pursuant to Indiana Code 35-37-4-5(c). 
(c) No immunities to law enforcement officers will be available to 
prevent such actions under section (a); however, acts perceived to be 
in good faith by the court or finder of fact are not eligible for 
punitive damages under any circumstances, and damages in such 
cases are limited to physical harms to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s 
chattels. 
(d) The law enforcement department can be held liable for its own 
unlawful policies and for the actions of its officers, even to the 
extent of punitive damages for particularly egregious acts. 
(e) This statute does not apply in situations where evidence seized 
during the unlawful act at issue is used in criminal proceedings 
against the party or a party in privity with the party who would bring 
suit under this section. 
This proposed statute aims to mitigate the difficulties of remedying Fourth 
Amendment violations under both the exclusionary rule and § 1983 actions.246  
Although this proposed statute offers only a civil remedy, it also prevents those 
who have been found with incriminating evidence from taking advantage of a more 
obtainable civil remedy by disqualifying suits that were first criminal actions. 
Further, the proposed statute assumes that exposing police officers to potential 
liability for home privacy violations247 will cause police officers to act more 
carefully and obtain warrants or consult prosecutors more often. This effect may, in 
turn, decrease the amount of improper home searches without dramatically 
changing exclusionary rule precedents or forcing courts to veer away from current 
policy considerations. In other words, police officers maintain some of the legal 
discretion allotted under Fourth Amendment criminal law, but may choose to use 
that discretion more carefully when a greater likelihood of civil liability, however 
minimal, is present. Theoretically, this result would strike a better balance between 
homeowners’ rights and the needs of law enforcement. 
In addition to encouraging officers to be more careful during the initial search, 
this proposed statute creates a viable means for innocent parties to recover civil 
damages instead of attempting to overcome qualified immunity in § 1983 claims248 
                                                                                                                 
 
 246. For another proposal of a “hybrid” solution to the Fourth Amendment remedy 
problem, see Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1 (2001). Professor Dripps argues that the exclusionary rule, in criminal cases, 
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because the reasonable subjective expectation of privacy is less than that in a home. See Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See, e.g., California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (probable cause justifies the warrantless search of an 
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 248. See supra Part III. 
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or forcibly expelling the officers under the Indiana castle doctrine statute. By 
making it more feasible for plaintiffs to be able to state a cause of action and 
proceed to discovery, the proposed statute will allow courts to address the merits 
and more accurately determine, in each case, whether a constitutional violation has 
occurred. Although this proposal has potential problems with decreasing judicial 
efficiency and levying some extra economic costs on taxpayers, these problems 
might give society and the legal system an incentive to hold officers more 
accountable for breaching home privacy. Because the Fourth Amendment most 
stringently protects against unlawful searches of private homes, many cases under 
this proposed statute, which focuses on unlawful home entry, will be worthy of 
litigation.249 Additionally, the easy cases will often lend themselves to summary 
judgment, just as many not-so-easy cases do under current § 1983 claims. The 
benefit of the potential “sorting” or “sequencing”250 standards that may arise under 
the proposed statute is that it could dispose of meritless cases without sweeping 
potentially legitimate cases under the rug like current qualified immunity standards.  
Some may argue that eliminating qualified immunity may lead to more 
restrictive court holdings due to the engrained policy preference of protecting law 
enforcement.251 Professor Jeffries argues that, without qualified immunity, “the 
prospect of imposing damages liability for past violations of new pronouncements 
would inhibit courts from some rulings they might otherwise embrace.”252 
Professor Jeffries thinks that courts would not award damages even when the 
particular rule of law is beneficial. Although this argument is at least applicable to 
§ 1983 actions, applying such an argument to a state statute aimed at preserving 
home privacy rights may not raise such a concern. First, the good faith provision in 
section (c) of the proposed statute would significantly limit damages in cases where 
officers rely on old precedent after a new precedent is adopted. Further, this Note 
argues that home privacy rights themselves are understood and embraced; it is the 
remedies for these rights that have diminished. There is no reason, for example, 
that private citizens should not be compensated for obvious physical damages when 
home privacy rights have been violated by a police officer, whether the act was or 
was not in good faith. Finally, the severity of Professor Jeffries’s problem is 
mitigated in the context of a state statute. Indiana can more likely maintain the 
appropriate scope of actions under the proposed statute, using state law, than courts 
attempting to deal with a federal statute, like § 1983, or a large body of federal case 
law. 
Other critics of the proposed statute may argue that it will clog dockets and 
cause just as many problems as current § 1983 doctrine because plaintiffs will 
merely file in federal court and tack on another claim under the proposed state 
statute because it would be within the same transaction or occurrence.253 Maybe so, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 249. See supra Part I.B. 
 250. See supra text accompanying notes 211–16. 
 251. See Jeffries, supra note 199, at 122 (“Of course, if there were no qualified immunity, 
there would be good reason to fear that constitutional tort cases would produce more 
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original). 
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 253. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). 
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but federal courts would nonetheless have to apply state law in regard to the state 
statute, and further, this Note argues that home privacy cases are worth the 
resources because of the importance of the right at stake—especially in light of the 
alternative proposed by the Indiana legislature. Granted, there are concerns about 
judicial resources and additional taxation that would almost certainly result from 
the proposed statute, but these concerns do not touch upon the question of whether 
these inconveniences and additional costs would be worth a more comprehensive 
and careful protection of home privacy—this Note argues that they would be. 
Although this Note’s proposed statute may not have given Mr. Barnes a criminal 
defense, such a statute may help to avoid similar homeowner aggression by 
providing an accessible civil remedy for home privacy invasion. Perhaps Mr. 
Barnes would not have assaulted the police officers had he known he would be able 
to file a civil suit to determine whether the officers unlawfully invaded the home—
one that would be free of the inadequacies found in § 1983 actions.254 More 
importantly, perhaps the officers who arrived at the Barnes’s apartment would have 
allowed caution to prevail and not entered if they knew such an entry may have 
given rise to civil liability. The lesson to be learned from the Barnes cases is not 
that homeowners need more guns and more leeway to assault police officers who 
unlawfully enter the home;255 the lesson is that alternative remedies need to be 
strengthened so that average citizens are not called upon to make legal 
determinations or snap judgments when their perceived home privacy rights are 
threatened. 
CONCLUSION 
After Barnes, the Indiana legislature rightly considered passing new legislation 
because it became clearer that victims of home privacy violations had few, if any, 
viable remedies. The foundation of law in this country is based on the proposition 
that for every right, there must be a remedy in case of a violation.256 The right of 
home privacy and protection against unlawful home entries by law enforcement is a 
foundational and highly cherished right in the Constitution. Along with freedom of 
speech and religion, home privacy is a touchstone of American civil liberty. The 
recently-amended Indiana statute does not protect this right; in fact, it hinders legal 
home privacy protection by defining extremely narrow, factual circumstances that 
citizens, particularly those who feel their “castle” has been breached, cannot 
comprehend. The Barnes decision was not wrong, or against public policy, but the 
other remedies on which Indiana courts and citizens must rely are inadequate in 
protecting home privacy and providing viable remedies that citizens can pursue; 
even worse is the prospect of citizens misinterpreting the new Indiana statute and 
committing violent acts against police officers. Although public policy 
considerations have made Fourth Amendment remedies less effective, alternatives 
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such as this Note’s proposed statute are plausible. Indiana should implement such 
an alternative in order to mitigate the difficulties with the exclusionary rule and 
§ 1983 actions, which would, in turn, provide Indiana citizens with an accessible 
and identifiable remedy when their home privacy rights are violated. 
 
